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Abstract
We provide an assessment of the state of scholarly and policy debates on migrant
entrepreneurs in development. They are often described as super-entrepreneurs
who contribute to development through (i) being more entrepreneurial than natives;
(ii) providing remittances that fund start-ups in their countries of origin and (iii)
returning entrepreneurial skills to their home countries when they re-migrate. We
evaluate these three views and conclude that the empirical evidence to support the
notion of the migrant as a super-entrepreneur is weak. We further argue that the
evidence is less ambiguous on the general development contribution of migration
over and above its contribution through entrepreneurship. The implication is
that removal of discriminatory barriers against migrants and against migrant
entrepreneurs in labour, consumer and financial markets will promote development
in both sending and receiving countries, not least through reducing the shares of
migrants that are reluctant entrepreneurs.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship and migration are at the very top of many national and international
agendas. It is easy to see why: globally there are probably a billion entrepreneurs
(measured in terms of self-employment) and more than 232 million cross-border migrants
(United Nations, 2013). The development impacts of both migrants and entrepreneurs
are therefore likely to be substantial. For instance, migrant remittances are estimated
to be around US dollar 550 billion annually (more than 2 times the volume of
aid) (World Bank, 2013). It contributes significantly to poverty reduction in some
countries (Adams and Page, 2005). In the same vein entrepreneurs invest billions and
create substantial numbers of jobs. Both migration and entrepreneurship, including
transnational entrepreneurship have therefore attracted attention from policy-makers,
donors, NGOs and others interested in their possible impacts on poverty reduction and
development.
The problem is that entrepreneurship and migration policies often do more harm to the
poor and to development, than good. Naude´ (2010, 2011) has dealt with the relationship
between entrepreneurship and development and growth, and the difficulties that well-
meaning but poorly-informed policies cause. Not all entrepreneurs create sustainable
or substantial jobs: most do not innovate much and substantial numbers of firms fail
after only a few years. In such a context of heterogeneity, policies are often ineffective;
and often may have undesired outcomes. For example, easing entry restrictions for
potential entrepreneurs may result in a large pool of entrepreneurs with insufficient
entrepreneurial ability and skills, which in combination with asymmetric information
about their skills and ability can result in a general contraction of finance from banks
(who do not want to lend to entrepreneurs with poor ability) (de Meza and Webb, 1987).
Much scarce resources are being spent on providing training and education to prospective
entrepreneurs with little, and even opposite than intended, outcomes. Often participants
of such programs only realize what it means to be an entrepreneur during the course and
as such their aspirations change because of this additional knowledge, even discouraging
some who had initially planned to start their own business (Oosterbeek et al., 2010).
In the case of migration, poorly-informed policies have also created and continue to create
harm. Stricter border controls to prevent irregular migration from Africa to Europe,
for example, have not stopped migration flows, but instead led to a diversification of
migration routes and to a much more dangerous migration journey (de Haas, 2009). The
debate on the economic development implications of migration is a long-standing and
often emotional one.
Recently there has been more attention in this debate on the role of migrant
entrepreneurs. They are often hailed as akin to super-entrepreneurs with consequent
high expectations for their role in business start-ups and job creation. The problem
is that this may mask and even exacerbate bad immigration policies. For instance in
justifying too much of a focus on attracting certain types of migrant entrepreneurs, or
training return migrants to be entrepreneurs, rather than facilitating migrants’ access to
wage employment and the formal economy.
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The super-entrepreneur view of migrants is based on three stylized facts or beliefs
regarding migrants: (i) migrants are more entrepreneurial than natives; (ii) migrant
remittances can fund start-ups in the countries of origin; (iii) return migration can bring
valuable entrepreneurial skills to developing home countries. A more nuanced discussion
on these relationships is necessary and in this paper we provide a review of the existing
evidence on these stylized facts in the context of the broader debate on the role of
migration in development.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relationship
between migration, development and entrepreneurship, considering the three stylized
facts mentioned. Then in section 3 we evaluate the empirical evidence in this regard.
Section 4 considers the implications the empirical evidence has for immigration policies.
Section 5 concludes with a summary and recommendations.
2 The Migration-Development-Entrepreneurship
Nexus
A discussion of migrant entrepreneurship and its implications for development requires
background on the broader context of migration and development. Migrant entrepreneurs
are, perhaps foremost as we will argue, migrants, and their impact on development will
very much hinge on the channels through which they can change development outcomes,
directly or indirectly. Entrepreneurship is but one of these channels; often an overrated
one. Furthermore, migrants decisions, including whether and when to migrate and their
occupational choices are a function of development. The migration and development
literature is however substantial. In what follows we will give a brief summary of the
different channels through which migration may impact development and analyze how
being entrepreneurial may matter or not.
We first argue that migration has a significant impact on development (broadly defined).
Then we discuss the salient facts that may lead some to consider migrant entrepreneurs
as super-entrepreneurs, after which we confront this view with empirical evidence.
2.1 Does Migration Matter for Development?
de Haas (2010) provides a critical overview of the literature on migration and development
and shows that this body of work has vacillated between pessimism and optimism over
time. Based on the neoclassical theory of migration, opinion in the 1950s and 1960s
was that migration had a generally positive impact on development reflecting a virtuous
circle of labour mobility that would eventually even-off in the long-term (Castles, 2008).
The Lewis and Harris-Todaro models, for example, assume out-migration from low
productivity areas to be essential for rising productivity (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Lewis,
1954). This view changed in the 1970s and 1980s, during which period migration became
more widely seen as being part of a vicious circle of under-development, which widened
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the gap between core and periphery countries. Migration was blamed for maintaining
economic dependencies between rich and poor countries by causing a brain-drain from
poor to rich economies. Just before the recent (2013-2015) rise in immigration to Europe
(mainly as a result of conflict in the Middle East and Eastern Africa after the Arab
Spring) the pendulum had started to swing back towards a more positive assessment of the
development impact of migration, with notions of a brain-gain being modified to account
for a brain-circulation (Mountford, 1997; Saxenian, 2006; Docquier and Rapoport, 2011).
Recent theorizing on migration and development is based on the New Economics of
Labour Migration (NELM) and livelihood approaches (de Haas, 2010) which take a more
holistic view of migration and develpoment. Different aspects of migration, such as the
role of diasporas have surfaced and migrants are seen as agents of development, leading to
more nuanced research. For instance, migration have been established to have brain-drain
effects only for some of the poorest countries (Maria and Stryszowski, 2009; Beine et al.,
2008). In addition new evidence suggests that out-migration of highly skilled individuals
have substantial benefits, mainly for ‘the migrants themselves, who benefit through
massive gains in income and through greater human capital (Gibson and McKenzie,
2012) [p.371]. Migration has also been found to contribute to raising living standards of
those left behind(Acosta, 2007; Adams, 1991, 2004, 2006; Adams and Page, 2003, 2005;
Itzigsohn, 1995; Taylor et al., 2005) as well as increased human capital, brain-gain and
better return to human capital investments (Mountford, 1997; Stark and Wang, 2002).
The role of remittances has been the subject of special scrutiny given their sheer volume.
Remittances have significant welfare impacts on countries with large out-migration, for
example Jamaica and El Salvador (Giovanni et al., 2014) although this is more the case
when low-skilled individuals migrate than in the case of higher-skilled migrants, who tend
to remit less in per capita terms than low skilled migrants (Adams, 2009). Remittances
can also facilitate increases in household spending on education (Cox-Edwards and Ureta,
2003; Acosta, 2007), health services (Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Mansuri, 2007)
and savings or investments (de Haas, 2005). There is no conclusive evidence that
remittances unambiguously promote macro-economic growth (Yang, 2011).
Others have argued that out-migration does not only lead to higher levels of trade
(Egger et al., 2012; Fairlie and Lofstrom, 2013; Rauch and Trindade, 2002) and FDI
(Kugler and Rapoport, 2011) to developing countries, but also contributes through ‘social
remittances’. Social remittances are ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that
flow from receiving- to sending-country communities (Levitt, 1998) [p.927]. They can
be transferred to the origin country through modern communication methods such as
telephone, internet and mail, through migrants’ temporary return visits to their origin
country or through permanent return. Migrants transfer their know-how and skills to
family members or friends living in the origin country and this knowledge can then be
utilized by individuals or households in the home country.
In this context, Docquier et al. (2011) and Spilimbergo (2008) show that the level of
emigration is related to political developments in the home-country. Migrants can
contribute to the diffusion of democratic values and norms either directly upon return
or through contacts with relatives, or indirectly through social networks connecting the
diasporas with groups in the origin country (Docquier et al., 2011). Some have even
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argued that return migrants can increase the demand for political accountability and so
improve governance in their home countries (Batista and Vincente, 2010). However, the
opposite can also hold; Stel (2013) for instance finds in the case of the Lebanese Diaspora,
migrants often play an active role in entrenching political power in their home country.
This brief review illustrated a number of potential channels through which migration can
impact development in both sending and receiving countries. Migration movements have
implications on the macro-level of both countries as well as on the micro (individual or
household) and meso (community) level. One of the channels through which migration
may affect economic growth is through the entrepreneurial behaviour of migrants.
2.2 Are Migrant Entrepreneurs Super-Entrepreneurs?
We conclude from the previous section that migration has the potential to contribute
to development. But not all individuals and all countries benefit automatically from
migration: there is much country and individual heterogeneity in migration-development
outcomes. In this respect de Haas (2010) has cautioned against simplified assumptions
about the relationship between migration and development. He points out that there
‘is no automatic mechanism by which international migration leads to development
(p.240). This means that policies may matter very much in migration: and moreover that
migration policies may do much harm to development by distorting outcomes. Because
of the nature of the public and policy debates on migration (characterized very often
by a high degree of subjectivity), the need for an automatic mechanism of development
through migration has concentrated attention in recent years on the role on migrants as
entrepreneurs and facilitators of entrepreneurship.
Herein, migrants are often expected to be super-entrepreneurs. Proponents of this view
have pointed to the successes of migrant entrepreneurs in China and the USA to argue
that migrants may not need formal wage jobs. For instance it has been pointed out
that in successful developing countries, such as China, 25 percent of migrants are self-
employed (Giulietti et al., 2011). Saxenian (2002, 2006) and others have praised the
role of immigrants in the development of Silicon Valley, where close to one third of the
technology businesses were run by immigrant owners by the end of the 1990s.
Several countries have introduced policies specifically targeting migrant entrepreneurs
by introducing specific visa regulations for this group. They are seen as having high
potential to contribute to the local economy and are therefore welcomed in countries like
the Netherlands, Germany and many others (OECD, 2011). These policies are selective
in terms of admitting those migrants that bring sufficient human and/or financial capital
and that are likely to make a contribution to the economy of the respective country
(Marchand and Siegel, forthcoming).
Why are migrant entrepreneurs seen as ‘super-entrepreneurs’? The main argument is
based on selection. Migrant entrepreneurs may be less risk averse, as is evident in
their decision to migrate, itself a risky activity (Neville et al., 2014). And they have
been argued to be more able to spot opportunities for new businesses as they already
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spotted opportunities for migration (Hart, 2009). On the other hand, immigrants may
be found more proportionately amongst the self-employed because they may be excluded
from more formal wage opportunities, hence they may be driven into self-employment
and forced to become creative and problem-solving (Brixy et al., 2013). An additional
argument for the ‘super-entrepreneur view, which is particularly applied to return migrant
entrepreneurship, is that of capital accumulation through the migration experience.
Migrants are seen to have access to supplementary sources of support, training and
financing, as often migrants increase their educational level and/or gain new skills, save
more money and extend their social network while living abroad (de Haas, 2006; OECD,
2008).
These super-entrepreneurs and the diaspora communities of which they are
part can contribute to their home countries’ development (Riddle et al., 2010;
Wei and Balasubramanyam, 2006). For instance Vorderwuelbecke (2012) states that
migrant entrepreneurs often maintain strong social ties with their homeland community,
with positive benefits such as the transfer of business and technological know-how,
information exchange and remittances [p.43]. This extends the accepted view in the
literature that migrant communities can foster greater volumes of international trade
between sending and receiving countries (Vaaler, 2011).
Migrant entrepreneurs can also promote direct investment in their home countries as
transnational entrepreneurs: according to Riddle et al. (2010) around 20 per cent of FDI
to India between 1991 and 2001 was from its diaspora. However, the role of Indian (and
Chinese) diasporas may be unique; in the case of other countries Gibson and McKenzie
(2012) found a negligible role of (highly skilled) migrants in fostering FDI to their home
countries. Because a large proportion of migration is return migration, the role of return
migrants occupational decisions has attracted a growing body of research. In this view
the decision to migrate and to start a business upon return is often made simultaneously
(De´murger and Xu, 2011; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Rapoport, 2002). As such
larg(er) proportions of return migrants may become entrepreneurs (Marchetta, 2012;
Mesnard, 2004; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002). A further analysis of this evidence
will be presented in section 3.3 below.
In conclusion, a positive view of migrant entrepreneurs has gained acceptance within
the broader migration-development nexus. Within this many subscribe explicitly
or implicitly to a view that migrant entrepreneurs are super-entrepreneurs who will
benefit development in home and destination countries through their greater prowess as
entrepreneurs, their remittances, their trans-national entrepreneurial activity and their
business acumen. In the next section we examine whether these views are supported by
empirical evidence.
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3 Re-evaluating the Stylized Facts
3.1 Are immigrants really more entrepreneurial than natives?
Despite the a priori reasons for suspecting that migrants may be more entrepreneurial
than natives, as discussed in section 2.2, the empirical evidence is not strong. For instance,
a recent OECD (2010) review finds that migrant entrepreneurship, as measured by self-
employment rates, is more common than non-migrant entrepreneurship in only 13 out of
25 countries in the OECD. In other words in about half of the OECD countries, migrants
are less likely than natives to be self-employed. Moreover, in the countries with larger
immigrant populations, such as Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands,
migrants are much less likely than natives to be self-employed (OECD, 2010). In the case
of migrants in Germany, Brixy et al. (2013) even found that migrants believe less often
that they have the necessary skills to run a business and that they were not more risk
averse than non-migrants. And in the case of the Netherlands, Jansen et al. (2003) find
the rate of entrepreneurship amongst the native Dutch population as well as of the Turkish
immigrant population to be almost twice as high as amongst immigrant populations from
Morocco, Suriname and the Antilles.
The only study to compare start-up rates (early entrepreneurial activity) amongst
migrants and non-migrants across countries is the 2012 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM). It found that rates of early entrepreneurial activity (start-up rates) are similar
between migrants and non-migrants, and that start-up rates of migrants are just as
heterogeneous across countries as that of non-migrants. For instance the GEM found that
only 1.8 per cent of early entrepreneurial activity in Sub-Saharan Africa is undertaken
by first generation migrants, while the corresponding share is 11 per cent and 10 per cent
in the USA and Western Europe respectively (Vorderwuelbecke, 2012).
Self-employment per se may be a poor measure of entrepreneurship. Many argue that
what fundamentally characterizes entrepreneurs is their innovativeness, their creative
destruction to use Schumpeters term. So how well do migrant entrepreneurs do in
terms of innovation? It has been pointed out that migrant entrepreneurs may be
disproportionately represented, at least in the United States, amongst high-growth and
highly innovative enterprises (OECD, 2011; Saxenian, 2002; Wadhwa et al., 2007) and
biotech firms (Stephan and Levin, 2001) as well as public venture-backed US companies
(Anderson and Platzer, 2006) and high-impact companies (Hart and Acs, 2011). In the
2012 GEM survey on average 20 per cent of migrant-owned enterprises expected to create
10 or more jobs in the next five years, compared to only 14 per cent of non-migrant owned
enterprises (Vorderwuelbecke, 2012).
As far as innovation is concerned, around 16 per cent of high-tech firms in a recent
USA sample had a migrant owner, and moreover a migrant owner with skills in science
and engineering (Hart, 2009). Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2009), using USA patent
data, found that ‘immigrants account for 24 per cent of patents, twice their share in the
population, and that the skilled immigrant patenting advantage over skilled natives is
entirely accounted for by immigrants’ disproportionately holding degrees in science and
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engineering [p.4]. Despite the clear contributions that migrant entrepreneurs have made
to innovation in the USA, Hart and Acs (2011) cannot find evidence that migrant owned
high-tech firms in the USA are more likely to register patents or spend more on research
and development than native owned firms. Supporting this point, the survey by Hart
(2009) of high-tech entrepreneurship (the most innovative form of entrepreneurship) in
the USA concluded that ‘most previous studies have overstated the role of immigrants in
high-tech entrepreneurship’ [p.3].
The 2012 GEM survey attempted to measure the innovation of enterprises as the number
of new products or services they introduced across 69 countries, taking into account
whether the enterprises in question were owned by a migrant or non-migrant. Analyses
of the survey results could not find significant differences between the innovativeness of
migrant and non-migrant entrepreneurs (Vorderwuelbecke, 2012).
As a final measure of the entrepreneurial prowess of migrants, one may compare the
average performance of migrant enterprises to that of non-migrants. Using performance
measures such as sales growth and profits from new Canadian start-ups, Neville et al.
(2014) find that migrant enterprises are not generally better performing than those of non-
migrants and that very often immigrant-owned firms underperformed. Only in the case
of migrant firms that export do they find superior performance, suggesting to them that
these migrant firms may have better international networks. The usual suspects in firm
performance such as experience, skills, gender, access to finance and growth orientation
were found to apply in equal measure to both migrant and non-migrant enterprises.
Similarly Dai and Lui (2009) finds that in the case of China’s Zhongguancun Science Park
(ZSP) return migrants who export more, due to their international networks, performed
better than non-migrants.
Saxenian (2002, 2006) and others have argued that the development of high-tech sectors
and innovation clusters in countries such as China, India and Taiwan resulted due to
the remigration of entrepreneurs (transnational entrepreneurs) from places like Silicon
Valley and elsewhere in the USA. More recently Kenney et al. (2012) challenged this
interpretation, concluding from a historical overview of the creation and establishment
of ICT industries in these countries that return migrants were not critical in their
establishment. They conclude that the roles of native entrepreneurs and governments
were more essential for the emergence and establishment of these industries than return
migrants and that ‘the importance of the returnees is more likely in deepening home
country industrial development and connections to the US’ [p.395].
3.2 Are migrant remittances likely to fund entrepreneurship in
their home countries?
In the new economics of labor migration (NELM) the decision to migrate is seen not
as only a decision an individual makes, but a decision that is taken at the household
level to deal with risks, market imperfections and obstacles in their environment. If
for instance, a lack of liquidit and/or poorly functioning financial markets obstruct
households to establish business enterprises, migration of some family members and their
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remittances may be a way of overcoming these financial constraints, making it possible
for them to invest in agricultural innovations, land and housing, and small businesses
(Lucas and Stark, 1985).
The literature on the impact of remittances on development contains controversial
findings. It contains on one hand a somewhat pessimistic view of the role of remittances,
recognizing negative effects such as moral hazard (Chami et al., 2003) and exchange rate
appreciation and reduced export competitiveness (Amuado-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004;
Bourdet and Falck, 2006). On the other hand a more optimistic view emphasizes that
remittances can contribute to poverty reduction, consumption smoothing and household
expenditure (Acosta, 2007; Adams, 2006). Remittances can also raise household
spending on education (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Acosta, 2007) and health services
(Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Mansuri, 2007). In addition, part of remittances that
are received by households may be used for savings or investments (de Haas, 2005).
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) show that in some countries with underdeveloped
financial systems remittances are used to overcome credit and liquidity constraints and
are invested into small business development. They find that when the development
of the financial sectors is lower the contribution of remittances to economic growth is
stronger (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009).
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of remittances to encourage
entrepreneurship in migrant sending countries is, however, also mixed. For instance
Amuado-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) show that in the case of the Dominican Republic
receiving remittances does not lead to an increased likelihood of owning a business, but
rather the opposite. Remittance receipt is associated with a reduced likelihood of business
operations. It has also been observed that households, who already operate a business,
are more likely to receive remittances from abroad (Amuado-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004).
Vasco (2013) studying migration and remittances in the case of rural Ecuador finds that
‘neither migration nor remittances have any effect on the odds of a household owning a
rural business’ [p.37]. Ang et al. (2009) also do not find a significant effect of remittances
on productive investments in the Philippines.
In the case of Mexico, on the other hand, remittances have been found to be a significant
source of capital for micro-enterprises (Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Olmedo, 2006). Investments
in businesses are seen increasingly in Mexican households and communities receiving
remittances from the United States (Massey and Parado, 1998). Woodruff and Zenteno
(2007) also find that SMEs in Mexico benefit financially from having links to migrant
networks in the USA and that in the case of high-tech firms they also grow faster as a
result, suggesting that migrant networks can alleviate financial constraints. In the case
of Nicaragua, Funkhouser (1992) establish that remittances have a small positive effect
on self-employment in receiving households. In El Salvador, in contrast, remittances
did not seem to impact self-employment activities in a household survey conducted in
2000. International remittances were, however, significantly and positively associated
with business ownership. These effects were particularly strong in rural areas and among
females (Acosta, 2007).
Yang (2008) estimates the responses of Filipino households to economic shocks in the
destination country of migrated household members. He shows that a positive shock
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leads to increased levels of investment in entrepreneurship in the origin households. Vaaler
(2011) find evidence that remittances support venture capital funds and firm start-ups in
home countries, especially when they come from migrants living in migrant communities
abroad. The effects decrease when the remittances are sent by highly educated migrants
Vaaler (2011).
Besides the direct use of remittances for business investments, remittances might also
indirectly contribute to the ability of a recipient household to engage in business activities.
A stable remittance income may be considered a positive attribute in the evaluation of
creditworthiness of a households when it comes to access to microloans or small business
loans (Ratha, 2007). Especially in contexts where households face high income volatility
and shocks otherwise, remittances can also favor income smoothing and as such make
households more attractive borrowers (Mohapatra et al., 2011).
Overall, however, most of the literature on development and migration seems to concur
that remittances are largely used to fund consumption (de Haas, 2010) which is not
necessarily a bad thing for households in the poorest countries (Yang, 2011). Whether
remittances are used for business investments and self-employment activities is highly
dependent on the context as is shown by the mixed evidence on the relationship between
the two. It seems that it matters where the remittances come from, where they go and
who is then responsible for the way they are used in the receiving household. As such more
research is necessary in order to really understand the interactions between remittances
and entrepreneurship and to establish under what conditions migrant remittances are
likely to fund entrepreneurship in their home countries.
3.3 Are return migrants more likely to be entrepreneurial than
non-migrants?
While there is a growing literature on the development impact of the rising flow of
remittances to poorer countries, it is only fairy recently that attention has been paid to the
potential of return migrants to start up enterprises in their home countries. This reflects
the greater awareness of the fact that most migration is not permanent, but temporary
(Mesnard, 2004). Hence, migrants may learn while away from their home country or
region, as well as gather savings and build foreign networks, all of which may alleviate
constraints on starting a new enterprise upon return (Marchetta, 2012; Rapoport, 2002).
However, while abroad migrants may lose contact with their networks at home, and
hence experience a depreciation of their social capital, which may make it more difficult
to establish a new enterprise. Accordingly, to the extent that credit constraints and lack
of skills and experience are obstacles to entrepreneurship in developing countries, and
social capital is not as crucial, one may expect return migrants to be more likely to be
able to start up new firms than non-migrants (Wahba and Zenou, 2012).
How valid is this expectation? Black and Costaldo (2009) report that the literature is
not unambiguously supporting this expectation and moreover that the types of businesses
started up by return migrants most often do not have a significant development impact.
Gibson and McKenzie (2012) find micro-economic evidence from five developing countries
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that return migration is common, and that although return migrants share knowledge
gained, they are not more productive as entrepreneurs or in wage labor back home than
non-migrants.
There are several studies investigating differences in entrepreneurial activities between
return migrants and non-migrants. The most common finding relates to financial capital,
and more specifically the role of savings accumulated abroad in the launch of a small
business upon return. For instance, both Arif and Irfan (1997) and Piracha and Vadean
(2010) find strong indication that return migrants are more likely to be self-employed in
business in comparison to non-migrants in Pakistan and Albania respectively. Using
data from Ghana and Coˆ te DIvoire Black and Costaldo (2009) find that return
migrants are more likely to start a new enterprise if they had accumulated savings and
stayed abroad longer. This trend was found to be stronger among poorer migrants.
They also found that any formal education received by migrants while abroad to be
insignificant for the entrepreneurship decision once they have returned. Similar results
were obtained for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Romania
and Tajikistan by Lianos and Pseiridis (2009) and by McCormick and Wahba (2001) for
Egypt. Ilahi (1999),Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) and Mesnard (2004) arrive at a
similar conclusion showing return migrants are particularly prone to invest savings from
abroad in business ventures back home, suggesting temporary migration may at times be
employed as a strategy to overcome credit constraints faced in the country of origin.
In the case of rural to urban migration in China, De´murger and Xu (2011) found that
return migrants were more likely than non-migrants to start up an enterprise and that the
likelihood of this was enhanced by the amount of savings accumulated and the experience
gained as measured by the frequency of job changes. Also for China, Giulietti et al. (2013)
found that not only are return migrants more likely than non-migrants to start up a
business, but that that they also promote entrepreneurship amongst family members
who did not migrate suggesting that knowledge and experience may be skills required in
Chinas rural areas to stimulate entrepreneurship.
Wahba and Zenou (2012) using migration data from Egypt also find that experience,
savings and duration abroad matter, and that the loss of social capital due to being out
of the country does not outweigh the benefits of finance and experience in starting up
a firm. In the case of Egypt their evidence indicate that return migrants could indeed
be more likely to become self-employed; however, they do recognize that the decision
of a migrant to return could be a decision made simultaneously to that of becoming
an entrepreneur, which would upwardly bias the propensity of return migrants to be
found in entrepreneurship; they find evidence of such an upward bias in their data
(Wahba and Zenou, 2012). Similar evidence of bias, and of the simultaneity in the
decisions to migrate and become entrepreneurial, is found by Batista et al. (2014) in
the case of return migration in Mozambique.
Problems faced by studies into the occupational choice of return migrants and the
probability that they enter into entrepreneurship are due to endogeneity and simultaneity
in the decisions to migrate and to start a new enterprise, and due to the fact that the
total population of return migrants are not available. Little has been done in the way
of controlled (or natural) experiments, and properly matched panel data is still scarce,
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although a number of studies have used bivariate probit models and instrumental variables
methods to deal with endogeneity issues. As a result of these shortcomings and given
the relatively few studies on the topic, a recent survey on migration and development
concluded that there is still much scope for further research on the determinants and
impacts of return migration and entrepreneurship (Gurgand et al., 2012).
4 Discrimination and Poor Policies
An individuals decision to become an entrepreneur or not has been studied by economists
as an occupational choice. In empirically studying this occupational choice the
evidence tends to suggest that the occupational choices of migrants is not significantly
different from that of non-migrants. Both migrants and non-migrants would be
more or less likely to be entrepreneurs as a result of their individual characteristics
(schooling, experience), household or community level factors (size of household, cultural
background), institutional determinants (access to finance) and the business environment.
It therefore does not seem from existing evidence that migrant entrepreneurs face
significant other challenges, apart from discrimination.
Migrant entrepreneurs, like migrants in general, suffer from various forms of
discrimination (Jansen et al., 2003; Zhou, 2004). A large number of authors mention
that migrants often face discrimination in formal labor markets, which then drives
them into (necessity) self-employment (Bruder and Raethke-Doeppner, 2008). This
can be due to structural discrimination (the need for a visa for example ); taste
discrimination (when employers prefer not to employ workers of a certain ethnicity due
to amongst others racial or ethnic stereo-typing and language barriers) and statistical
discrimination (when employers and job seekers have asymmetrical information about
their quality)(Bruder and Raethke-Doeppner, 2008). Rising xenophobia has been found
to push disproportionate numbers of migrants with limited English proficiency into
self-employment in the United States (Mora and Davila, 2007). That discrimination
and xenophobia foster self-employment amongst migrants is thus acknowledged. Hence
entrepreneurship can be used as a way to circumvent these obstacles (OECD, 2010)
[p.9] as a way for migrants to overcome social exclusion and integrate better with their
host community (Constant et al., 2007) as well as a way to improve their socioeconomic
mobility (Zhou, 2004).
A number of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of labor market discrimination
on the occupational choices of migrants in China, where legal discrimination, through for
instance the Hukou system, is well known. Frijters et al. (2011) find that if there would
be no discrimination against migrants in urban China, the number of self-employed
migrants would fall by 16 per cent, a significant proportion. Thus, when they have
a choice, migrants may often prefer wage employment to being self-employed. This
conclusion is supported by the empirical patterns of migrant self-employment in the
OECD (OECD, 2010) as well as studies from e.g. Germany which find that it is more
likely for less educated migrants to be self-employed than for higher educated migrants
(Constant and Zimmermann, 2006).
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Migrants also face discrimination in consumer markets which in turn create a demand
for the goods and services migrant entrepreneurs can provide, often in ethnic enclaves
(Jansen et al., 2003). Hence ethnic enclaves often act as a pull factor for migrants to
enter into self-employment (Price and Chacko, 2009).
Finally, migrant entrepreneurs themselves do face discrimination, especially when trying
to gain access to finance (Zhang, 2008). As a result, migrant entrepreneurs may be very
vulnerable to external shocks because they are often in entrepreneurship because they
lack access to wage employment (Brixy et al., 2013). In other words they are necessity
entrepreneurs (Constant and Zimmermann, 2006). Moreover, they often have access only
to types of businesses, e.g. in trade and services, that are more exposed to external
economic shocks (OECD, 2010). The GEM study, however, could not find evidence
across 69 countries that migrants are more likely to be necessity entrepreneurs than
non-migrants (Vorderwuelbecke, 2012). This does not mean that it is not the case;
certainly the finding that migrant entrepreneurs often perform worse than non-migrants
may suggest they indeed face more difficulties (Neville et al., 2014).
It should be stressed that a selection of migrant entrepreneurs occurs before migrants
even enter the host country. As the link between migration and entrepreneurship receives
more attention by policy-makers, a growing number of countries are introducing specific
policy measures for this group. As immigrant entrepreneurs are a heterogenous group
running different types of businesses, policies should ideally be equally diverse in order not
to exclude potential future entrepreneurs (Collins, 2003). However, considering policies
currently implemented it is evident that the diversity of this population is not addressed.
While overall the share of immigrants entering a country on an entrepreneur visa is
relatively small, the bulk of immigrant entrepreneurs does not qualify for this type of
visa, likely due to a lack of capital and experience, and usually enters the country through
another channel. Some of these might still migrate with the intention of starting their
own business. Particularly among highly skilled immigrants there may also be people
with high entrepreneurial ability. In some cases, however, policy hinders this. Migrants
entering on a work visa, for example, may not be allowed to start a business while on this
specific visa. This may be a waste of their potential contribution to the local economy.
An example from the Netherlands is that of ‘knowledge migrants who are only allowed
to work for their current employer. They are not allowed to start their own business
next to this employment while on a knowledge migrant visa. It is common for academics
to start their own (consultancy) business next to their University work; this type of
entrepreneurship is however restricted in the case of the Netherlands (Marchand and
Siegel, forthcoming).
When looking at return migrants and entrepreneurship it can be observed that policies
and programs are also sometimes developed based on overly positive assumptions.
An example of this is the fact that increasingly voluntary return programs contain
entrepreneurship components of different format. Some simply provide in-kind or
financial support, while others also offer training. The fact that this support is often given
to people with no prior experience in running a business and maybe even no interest in
doing so, can in this context be seen as a form of positive discrimination. It is, however,
the case that evaluations of such programs are largely lacking. In order to increase the
efficieny and effectiveness of such programs, more evidence is necessary.
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Overall it can be seen that there are several factors that on the one hand drive migrants
into entrepreneurship, such as the discrimination on the labour market, while on the other
hand, access to finance and policies often hinder potential entrepreneurs to put their plans
into action. Other policies and programs drive migrants into entrepreneurship who are
not necessarily suited for this.
5 Concluding Remarks
Migration is an important mechanism for raising the welfare of individuals and households
in developing countries through for example remittances and knowledge transfers
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2012). Migrants also contribute to the economy of their host
countries through their contributions to the labour market, paying taxes and social
contributions and overall economic growth (OECD, 2014). One way in which migrants
may contribute to the economy in both home and host country is through entreprenurial
activities. Based on the theoretical notion that migrants, like entrepreneurs, tend to be
less risk averse they are often seen as ‘super-entrepreneurs. The discussion on the linkages
between migration and entrepreneurship need to be more nuanced. Hence this paper tried
to bring together the existing state of knowledge on three the stylized facts on migration
and entrepreneurship: (i) migrants are more entrepreneurial than natives; (ii) migrant
remittances can fund start-ups in the countries of origin; (iii) return migration can bring
valuable entrepreneurial skills to developing home countries.
We found that the evidence is mixed on the question whether immigrants are more likely
to be self-employed than natives as well as whether immigrant entrepreneurs outperform
their native counterparts. Although highly context-specific, it is clear from the existing
evidence that entrepreneurship is not a natural choice for all immigrants. However,
migrants are disproportionately represented amongst high-growth and highly innovative
US firms. This may be explained by the fact that immigrants in the US for example also
disproportionally hold advanced degrees.
Immigrants also often face discrimination in the destination country. This may either
prevent potential entrepreneurs from actively pursuing business activities or drive
immigrants into necessity entrepreneurship that may otherwise prefer wage-employment.
Discrimination on the side of employers leads to such effects. Non-discrimination policies
would be beneficial in order to ensure maximization of productivity and the contributions
of migrants to the local economy. On the other hand, immigrants often face more
difficulties in obtaining credit than their native counterparts. As this is usually caused by
a lack of applicable collateral rather than discrimination this is more difficult to address
with policy. In order to support promising new immigrant entrepreneurs start-up funds
requiring less securities are an option that can be considered.
Notwithstanding the strong evidence in favor of the development impact of migration,
immigration policies are frequently predicated on as-yet-unsubstantiated assumptions
(Neville et al., 2014) [p.56]. For instance, much of current immigration policies in Europe
and other advanced economies are based on the belief that the type of migration a
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country promotes can influence the scope of entrepreneurship (OECD, 2010) [p.16] and
that preference should be given to high-skilled immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs/
investors. Even tough more than 30 countries have specific immigration policies that
target the attraction of entrepreneurs (Neville et al., 2014) not much is known about
the effect of such policies. In fact, the impact of many of these programmes (e.g.
entrepreneurship visas) seems to be negligible (OECD, 2010) although some countries
programmes, such as Chiles Start-Up Chile programme has attracted attention from the
media and from policy-makers elsewhere (Goube, 2014). Overall, it is, however, clear that
not enough research has been done on this and in particular on who is actually attracted
by such policies and incentives for entrepreneurs. It may very well be the case that they
are not attractive enough to attract those migrants that could be super-entrepreneurs.
Given that migrant entrepreneurs have not been proven to be super-entrepreneurs in
this paper and given that there is a significant demand for low-skilled workers in most
advanced economies, particularly in Europe (de Haas, 2009) (including a structural
demand for more workers in general, given declines in population growth ), imposing
policies based on the view of migrants as super-entrepreneurs is likely to be sub-
optimal. The costs of misunderstanding the potential of migrant entrepreneurs, or
raising immigration barriers, and of not doing more to allow their integration into wage
employment, is thus likely to be costly.
Turning the lens to the origin countries of migrants, the literature points out that
remittances are largely used for consumption smoothing rather than investment in
businesses. Largely depending on the business as well as migration context, the evidence
on the usage of remittances for such activities is mixed. It seems that it matters where
the remittances come from, where they go and who is then responsible for the way they
are used in the receiving household. It is, however, also clear that remittances are a
mechanism for overcoming credit constraints and therefore can enable entrepreneurial
behavior in situations whereit may otherwise be impossible.
Regarding the third stylized fact that we questioned, we found that research on
the occupational choice and business activities of return migrants show that capital
accumulated abroad does positively impact entrepreneurship among this group. Increased
human capital through education and work experience as well as financial capital,
accumulated savings, has been found to be main contributing factors as is the
migration experience itself. The loss of social capital in the origin country can largely
be compensated through these positive effects. Overall our understanding of the
entrepreneurial behaviours of returnees is hampered by insufficient empirical evidence;
hence the need for further research, specifically accounting for double selection effects in
emigrating, returning and entrepreneurship.
Policies and programs aiming at return migrant entrepreneurs are also often developed
based on overly positive assumptions. While some migrants may indeed want to
return and become an entrepreneur this is not the case for all returnees on which
entrepreneurship is forced. For example, voluntary return programs increasingly contain
entrepreneurship components of different format. Such support is often given to people
with no prior experience in running a business and maybe even no interest in doing
so. Given that it is known that return migration and entrepreneurship have been found
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to have positive interactions in some cases it is inecessary to understand better where
support may be beneficial in the process. In order to maximize the positive impacts
of such programs continuous evaluations of their impacts and proper targeting of the
efforts are essential. It is, however, the case that evaluations of such programs are largely
lacking.
Overall, it can be said that there is much more nuanced evidence on the linkages between
migration and entrepreneurship than one may think. However, it is important to note
that this evidence shows that the theoretical assumptions about the entrepreneurial
capacities of migrants may outweigh the actual effects. There is evidence on some of
the positive interlinkages between migration and entrepreneurship such as the share
of migrants among high-growth entrepreneurs or the positive outcomes of those return
migrants chosing to become entrepreneurs. At the same time, it is also clear that evidence
on many aspects of the migration-entrepreneurship nexus is limited. In particular, it is
important to understand that not all migrants are entrepreneurs and that different kinds
of migrants are much more likely to end up in entreprenurship, with different success
rates. More research along these lines is therefore necessary so that the dialogue is
not so much on migration and entrepreneurship, but rather on, for example, highly
skilled migrants and entrepreneurship, forced return migrants and entrepreneurship,
or immigrants and necessity versus opportunity entrepreneurship. Different kinds of
migration as well as different kinds of entrepreneurship ultimately also have different
implications for development. Further research along these lines is therefore needed
in order to fully understand the dynamics guiding the interactions between migration,
entrepreneurship and development.
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